Articles Posted in Sex Discrimination

Edgar M. Rivera, Esq.

On August 22, 2017, in Edwards v. Nicolai, the First Department Appellate Division—the appellate court of the counties of New York and the Bronx—overturned the trial court’s decision to dismiss gender discrimination claims, allowing Plaintiff Dilek Edwards to pursue her claims against Defendants Charles V. Nicolai and his wife, Stephanie Adams, a former Playboy Playmate. Ms. Edwards alleges that Mr. Nicolai and Ms. Adams—co-owners of Wall Street Chiropractic and Wellness (WSCW)—discriminated against her by terminating her employment because she was sexually attractive.

In April 2012, Mr. Nicolai hired Ms. Edwards as a yoga and massage therapist. According to Ms. Edwards, her relationship with Mr. Nicolai was “purely professional,” and Mr. Nicolai “regularly praised Plaintiff’s work performance throughout her period of employment.” In June 2013, however, Mr. Nicolai allegedly “informed Plaintiff that his wife might become jealous of Plaintiff, because Plaintiff was too cute.” Approximately four months later, Ms. Adams sent Ms. Edwards a text message stating, “You are NOT welcome any longer at Wall Street Chiropractic, DO NOT ever step foot in there again, and stay the [expletive] away from my husband and family!!!!!!! And remember I warned you.” A few hours later, Ms. Edwards allegedly received an email from Mr. Nicolai stating, “You are fired and no longer welcome in our office. If you call or try to come back, we will call the police.”

Lev Craig

On August 10, 2017, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s sex discrimination and FMLA interference claims in Shultz v. Congregation Shearith Israel of the City of New York. The Second Circuit found that the defendant’s notice to the plaintiff of her future termination constituted an adverse employment action, even though the notice of termination was later revoked.

Alana Shultz began working as Program Director at a New York City synagogue in 2004. In June 2015, Shultz, who was pregnant at the time, got married and notified her employer that she was pregnant. Shortly after Shultz disclosed her pregnancy, the synagogue notified Shultz that her employment would be terminated effective August 14, 2015, purportedly due to “restructuring.” Suspecting that the supposed “restructuring” was pretext for terminating her because of her pregnancy and because the synagogue’s leadership “disapproved of the fact that she was pregnant at the time of her marriage,” Shultz retained counsel, who then notified the synagogue of Shultz’s intent to pursue legal claims. Several days later, the synagogue rescinded its notice of termination, telling Shultz that it had “reinstated” the Program Director position and that she would therefore retain her position.

By Edgar M. Rivera

On May 24, 2017, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff Brittany Tovar’s sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). The court held that Defendant Essentia Health’s denial of insurance coverage for Ms. Tovar’s son’s transition-related medical procedures did not state a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII, since Ms. Tovar did not suffer discrimination based on her own sex and therefore lacked statutory standing.

Ms. Tovar, a nurse practitioner, worked for Essentia Health from 2010 to 2016. During her employment at Essentia Health, she was enrolled in an employer-provided health insurance plan that also covered her teenage child, who is a transgender boy, meaning that he was designated female at birth but identifies as male. In 2014, doctors diagnosed Ms. Tovar’s son with gender dysphoria and recommended various treatments, including medications and gender reassignment surgery, for which Ms. Tovar sought coverage under her employer’s insurance plan.

Lev Craig

On May 3, 2017, in Philpott v. State of New York, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York refused to dismiss sexual orientation discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York joined a growing number of courts across the country in finding sexual orientation discrimination cognizable under Title VII, stating, “I decline to embrace an illogical and artificial distinction between gender stereotyping discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination.”

Plaintiff Jeffery Philpott was employed at the SUNY College of Optometry as Vice President of Student Affairs, where, according to his complaint, he was subjected to years of discrimination and harassment because he is gay. Philpott alleges that his supervisors and coworkers mockingly called him “sensitive” and “flamboyant,” told him that “separate but equal treatment of gay people might be best,” dismissively referred to his relationship with his long-term domestic partner as “this marriage, or whatever you want to call it,” and refused to let him meet their families because they did not “want our children to be around homosexuality.” In addition, SUNY allegedly excluded him from meetings and projects because of his sexual orientation and implied that he deserved a lower salary because he is gay, telling him that “your team [i.e., gay people] doesn’t have kids. You have more than you need.” Shortly after Philpott complained to SUNY of the ongoing discrimination, Philpott claims, SUNY terminated his employment. Philpott filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), then filed suit in federal court, alleging hostile work environment, wrongful termination, and retaliation claims under Title VII.

Lev Craig

In October, we reported that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had vacated its July 2016 decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, where a former adjunct college professor brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), alleging that her employer had refused to hire her for a full-time position because she is a lesbian. Yesterday, April 4, 2017, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and became the first Court of Appeals to hold that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”

Kimberly Hively, who is openly gay, started teaching part-time at Ivy Tech Community College in 2000. Between 2009 and 2014, she unsuccessfully applied for six different full-time positions. When the college also failed to renew her part-time contract in July 2014, Hively filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and subsequently brought suit pro se in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, alleging that she had been denied employment opportunities because she is a lesbian. The district court dismissed Hively’s complaint on the grounds that Title VII did not cover sexual orientation discrimination, and Hively appealed.

Lev Craig and Harrison Paige

On March 27, 2017, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part the district court’s decision in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Incorporated, et al. Plaintiff Matthew Christiansen brought claims against his former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), alleging discrimination on the basis of his HIV-positive status and his failure to conform to gender stereotypes. The lower court dismissed Christiansen’s federal claims for failure to state a claim; the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of the ADA claim, but reversed the dismissal of the Title VII claim, finding that Christiansen had plausibly alleged a Title VII gender stereotyping claim.

Christiansen, an openly gay man who is HIV-positive, was the creative director for DDB Worldwide Communications Group Incorporated (“DDB”), an international advertising agency and Omnicom subsidiary. According to the complaint, Christian’s direct supervisor, Joe Cianciotto, subjected Christiansen to a “pattern of humiliating harassment targeting his effeminacy and sexual orientation.” Cianciotto allegedly drew offensive, obscene caricatures of Christiansen on an office whiteboard, the most explicit of which depicted Christiansen naked with an erection, captioned with a mocking comment about same-sex marriage. On another occasion, according to the complaint, Cianciotto created a “Muscle Beach Party” poster, which he circulated amongst office members and posted on Facebook, displaying DDB employees’ heads photoshopped onto the bodies of people in swimwear; on the poster, Christiansen’s head was pasted onto a photo of a woman in a bikini, lying on the ground with her legs upright in the air “in a manner that one coworker thought depicted Christiansen as ‘a submissive sissy.’”

Lev Craig

Earlier this month, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part the district court’s decision in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace.

Jameka Evans worked at Georgia Regional Hospital (the “Hospital”) in Atlanta, Georgia, as a security officer. Evans, who is a lesbian, had a masculine gender presentation at work: she wore the men’s security officer uniform, men’s shoes, and a short, masculine haircut. According to Evans’ complaint, the Hospital discriminated against her because of her sexual orientation and because she did not behave in a “traditional woman[ly] manner.” Evans alleged that she was denied equal pay, harassed, physically assaulted, targeted for termination, and retaliated against after making a complaint of discrimination to the Hospital’s Human Resources department.

Shelby Krzastek

On March 8, 2017, Anita Poe-Smith filed suit against Epic Health Services, Inc. (“Epic”), and Leo and Sherrie Weigand, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. Ms. Poe-Smith works for Epic as a home health aide.

In February 2015, Epic assigned Ms. Poe-Smith to work for a client residing in the home of Leo and Sherrie Weigand. Ms. Poe-Smith claims that from February 2015 to May 2015, Mr. Weigand sexually harassed her by directing sexual innuendos and inappropriate comments toward her and, ultimately, physically assaulting her when, according to Ms. Poe-Smith, Mr. Weigand pushed her down and hit her on her buttocks. After reporting the incident to Epic, Ms. Poe-Smith was offered a new assignment, which she was unable to accept because it interfered with her familial obligations. Several weeks later, Epic offered her another full-time assignment, which she accepted. Ms. Poe-Smith then sued Epic Health Services and the homeowners for sexual harassment and retaliation.

Harrison Paige and Lev Craig

On February 27, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling in Kalu v. Florida Department of Children and Families, a gender discrimination suit brought under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendant, a Florida state hospital, finding that plaintiffs—two female nurse practitioners at the hospital—had failed to show that a $20,000 disparity between their pay and a male nurse practitioner’s salary constituted unlawful gender discrimination in violation of the EPA.

Plaintiffs Patricia Kalu and Susan Linder-Wyatt worked as nurse practitioners at a hospital managed by the Florida Department of Children and Families. When plaintiffs discovered that they made nearly $20,000 less than Michael Peel, a male nurse practitioner with identical job responsibilities, they filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, alleging that the pay disparity between female and male nurse practitioners violated the EPA. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs had failed to show that the hospital’s pay disparity was discriminatory, and plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

Lev Craig

On Wednesday, President Trump rescinded protections implemented by the Obama administration which had, among other things, allowed transgender students to use the school restrooms and facilities corresponding with their gender identities.

Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title IX) prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs, but does not explicitly protect transgender individuals. Last May, the Obama administration issued guidance regarding transgender students to all public schools in the U.S. in a joint letter from the Departments of Justice and Education. The guidance stated that both departments interpret Title IX’s prohibition against sex discrimination as encompassing “discrimination based on a student’s gender identity, including discrimination based on a student’s transgender status” and that the departments “treat a student’s gender identity as the student’s sex for purposes of Title IX and its implementing regulations.” Effectively, the guidance required schools to treat transgender students the same as non-transgender students of the same gender for Title IX purposes—for example, schools could not subject transgender girls to different rules and policies than non-transgender girls—and prohibited schools from discriminating against students on the basis of transgender status.