Lev Craig

Last week, on September 13, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied Uber’s motion for partial summary judgment in Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc. This decision allows a putative class of Philadelphia-based Uber drivers to move forward with claims against Uber for failing to compensate them for “on-call” time they spent logged into the Uber app, but not driving customers.

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to compensate employees for all hours worked, including on-call time: hours worked where “the employee is required to remain on the employer’s premises, or […] although not required to remain on the employer’s premises, finds his time on call away from the employer’s premises is so restricted that it interferes with personal pursuits.” The recent rise of gig economy work— individual projects and tasks picked up at a worker’s discretion, often using apps like Uber and TaskRabbit—has presented a challenge to the existing model of on-call time, as courts are asked to consider what constitutes compensable on-call time for workers who may never report to a central place of employment or who are, at least to some degree, able to work whenever they choose.

Owen H. Laird

The Harman Firm blog has run several stories over the past year about the evolving case law concerning sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  Last week, a plaintiff in a sexual orientation discrimination case in the Eleventh Circuit, Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, requested that the United States Supreme Court take up the issue.

To recap: Title VII is one of the foundational federal anti-discrimination statutes; it protects employees against discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion.  Sexual orientation is not one of the protected statuses enumerated in Title VII.  In 2016, however, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) – the federal agency tasked with administering Title VII – filed two lawsuits asserting sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII.  This was a major change, as both the EEOC and nearly every federal court had previously taken the position that sexual orientation discrimination was not prohibited under Title VII.

Edgar M. Rivera, Esq.

On September 5, 2017, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision in EEOC v. CollegeAmerica Denver, Inc., allowing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to proceed with its interference claim against CollegeAmerica.

On September 1, 2012, after Debbi Potts’s resignation as campus director for CollegeAmerica, a private college based in Salt Lake City, she and CollegeAmerica entered into an agreement which provided that CollegeAmerica would pay her $7,000 in exchange for her waiving any claims against CollegeAmerica (Ms. Potts had asserted that CollegeAmerica owed her $7,000 in unpaid bonuses), refraining from personally contacting any governmental or regulatory agency with the purpose of filing any complaint or grievance against CollegeAmerica, and refraining from disparaging the reputation of CollegeAmerica.

Lev Craig

On September 6, 2017, a coalition of 16 states filed suit against the federal government in response to the Trump administration’s pronouncement that it would revoke the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program established by President Obama. The lawsuit, led by New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman and filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleges that rescinding DACA unlawfully discriminates against individuals of Mexican national origin, violates the due process rights of DACA grantees, and negatively impacts states’ residents and economies.

DACA was established by the Obama administration in June 2012 via an executive branch memorandum issued by Janet Napolitano, the then–Secretary of Homeland Security. The policy allowed undocumented immigrants who had arrived in the U.S. before the age of 16 and met certain eligibility conditions to apply to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for work permits and protection from deportation for two years. Immigrants requesting DACA were required to have lived continuously in the U.S. since 2010 and to be currently in school, have a high school diploma or GED, or be an honorably discharged U.S. military veteran. In addition, individuals who had been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors, or who USCIS determined would “otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety,” could not apply for DACA.

Edgar M. Rivera

On August 31, 2017, in State of Nevada v. United States Department of Labor, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas invalidated the Department of Labor’s final rule, which increased the salary threshold for “white collar” exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

Employers claiming that an employee is exempt under the executive, administrative, or professional exemption from FLSA overtime requirements (called the “white collar” exemptions since they pertain to white-collar workers) must show that the employee performs specific job functions (the duties test) and is paid a salary above a certain threshold (the salary test). Under the Obama Administration, the Department of Labor promulgated a final rule that would double the salary threshold, moving it from $455 a week (or $23,660 annually) to $913 a week (or $47,476 annually). The new salary level is based on the 40th percentile of weekly earnings of full-time salaried workers in the lowest-wage and most impoverished U.S. census region—the South—which comprises the states Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, Washington D.C., North Carolina, and South Carolina. The final rule was intended to go into effect on December 1, 2016.

Owen H. Laird

On Monday, millions of people across the United States enjoyed their Labor Day by doing what people do on Labor Day: getting one last day in at the beach, holding a cookout, spending time with family and friends, catching a baseball game, or any of the other quintessentially American activities that spring to mind when you think of Labor Day.

Labor Day, however, is not “celebrated” in the way most other holidays are.  That is, people do not, generally, take time on Labor Day to consider or observe the meaning of the holiday.  Labor Day is typically viewed as simply a day off marking the end of summer, rather than bearing any special significance about workers’ rights.  With organized labor fading, economic inequality growing, and workers’ rights being curtailed, it is important to remember the origin and significance of Labor Day, and to continue the fight that led to its creation.

Owen H. Laird

Earlier this month marked the twenty-fourth anniversary of the passage into law of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). This groundbreaking piece of legislation has, over the last nearly quarter-century, been among the only federal protections for employees who need to take medical leave to care for themselves or for a family member.

In short, the FMLA allows certain employees, under certain circumstances, to take up to 12 weeks of leave in order to seek treatment for their own serious medical condition or to care for a family member. Without the FMLA, most employees would have no protection in the event of an emergency and would be forced to rely on the goodwill of their employer or—if they had one—a short-term disability policy. The FMLA was trailblazing legislation at the time of its passage and has helped millions of Americans in need from the early years of the Clinton administration through today. However, much still needs to be done to protect people in the workplace who need to take time off because of a medical issue.

Edgar M. Rivera, Esq.

On August 22, 2017, in Edwards v. Nicolai, the First Department Appellate Division—the appellate court of the counties of New York and the Bronx—overturned the trial court’s decision to dismiss gender discrimination claims, allowing Plaintiff Dilek Edwards to pursue her claims against Defendants Charles V. Nicolai and his wife, Stephanie Adams, a former Playboy Playmate. Ms. Edwards alleges that Mr. Nicolai and Ms. Adams—co-owners of Wall Street Chiropractic and Wellness (WSCW)—discriminated against her by terminating her employment because she was sexually attractive.

In April 2012, Mr. Nicolai hired Ms. Edwards as a yoga and massage therapist. According to Ms. Edwards, her relationship with Mr. Nicolai was “purely professional,” and Mr. Nicolai “regularly praised Plaintiff’s work performance throughout her period of employment.” In June 2013, however, Mr. Nicolai allegedly “informed Plaintiff that his wife might become jealous of Plaintiff, because Plaintiff was too cute.” Approximately four months later, Ms. Adams sent Ms. Edwards a text message stating, “You are NOT welcome any longer at Wall Street Chiropractic, DO NOT ever step foot in there again, and stay the [expletive] away from my husband and family!!!!!!! And remember I warned you.” A few hours later, Ms. Edwards allegedly received an email from Mr. Nicolai stating, “You are fired and no longer welcome in our office. If you call or try to come back, we will call the police.”

Lev Craig

On August 10, 2017, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s sex discrimination and FMLA interference claims in Shultz v. Congregation Shearith Israel of the City of New York. The Second Circuit found that the defendant’s notice to the plaintiff of her future termination constituted an adverse employment action, even though the notice of termination was later revoked.

Alana Shultz began working as Program Director at a New York City synagogue in 2004. In June 2015, Shultz, who was pregnant at the time, got married and notified her employer that she was pregnant. Shortly after Shultz disclosed her pregnancy, the synagogue notified Shultz that her employment would be terminated effective August 14, 2015, purportedly due to “restructuring.” Suspecting that the supposed “restructuring” was pretext for terminating her because of her pregnancy and because the synagogue’s leadership “disapproved of the fact that she was pregnant at the time of her marriage,” Shultz retained counsel, who then notified the synagogue of Shultz’s intent to pursue legal claims. Several days later, the synagogue rescinded its notice of termination, telling Shultz that it had “reinstated” the Program Director position and that she would therefore retain her position.

Lev Craig

On August 3, 2017, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs in Allen v. City of Chicago, a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action brought by Chicago area police officers. The court found that the officers were not entitled to overtime pay for off-duty work they had performed on their mobile devices because the city had not known that plaintiffs were not being compensated for their work and because plaintiffs had not been prevented from requesting overtime pay.

The FLSA requires employers to compensate employees for all hours worked, and to compensate most employees at the overtime premium rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a work week. This requirement is strict: So long as an employer is aware that an employee has performed work, the employer must fully compensate the employee for all hours worked, “even if [the employer] did not ask for the work, even if they did not want the work done, and even if they had a rule against doing the work.” If an employer does not want employees to work overtime hours, it is the employer’s obligation to “exercise its control and see that the work is not performed,” not the employee’s obligation to avoid working overtime hours. However, the FLSA’s mandate does not go so far as to cover work that the employer “did not know about, and had no reason to know about”; employees also have a duty to accurately report their time to their employer, and employees who fail to do so or who actively prevent their employer from learning of their hours worked are not covered by this protection.